MISP: Non-admin users can change login email under external authentication to capture a directory identity
MISP contains an authorization flaw in the user login-email change logic. When an external authentication backend is configured (LDAP, Shibboleth, ApacheSecureAuth, or CustomAuth), the login email address serves as the key by which the directory service resolves a user's identity, organization, and role on each login. The __canChangeLogin() method in UsersController only checked the MISP.disable_user_login_change setting and site-admin status; it did not account for whether an external authentication backend was active. As a result, any authenticated non-admin user (including org admins) could change their own login email to an address that matches a higher-privilege account in the external directory. On the user's next login, the external backend would resolve that email to the target directory identity, granting the attacker the organization and role associated with that identity. This constitutes an account-identity capture and privilege escalation: the attacker effectively assumes the identity of any directory account whose email they can guess or discover. The vulnerability requires an authenticated session with a valid API key or session token and a MISP instance configured with at least one external authentication backend. The impact is limited to the scope of the captured directory identity's privileges within MISP.