Improperly Controlled Sequential Memory Allocation in Wireshark
Multiple protocol dissector crashes in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
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Multiple protocol dissector crashes in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
TLS protocol dissector memory leak in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Exported PDU protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
ACN protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Multiple protocol dissector crashes and infinite loops, and memory leaks in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Multiple protocol dissector crashes in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Multiple protocol dissector crashes in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Multiple protocol dissector crashes in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows multipart parameter smuggling via attacker-influenced part metadata. Req.Utils.encode_form_part/2 in lib/req/utils.ex builds the per-part headers by interpolating the caller-supplied name, filename, and content_type values directly into the content-disposition and content-type lines with no escaping or CRLF stripping. A value containing ", \r, or \n closes the surrounding quoted value and starts a new header line; an additional \r\n--<boundary> terminates the current part and prepends a smuggled part of the attacker's choosing. This is reachable through every supported way of supplying a part. It is particularly easy when value is a %File.Stream{}, because filename then defaults to Path.basename(stream.path) and POSIX filenames may legitimately contain \r and \n. Any application that forwards user-controlled filenames (or field names / MIME types) through Req.post/2 with form_multipart: lets an attacker inject arbitrary headers into the outgoing multipart body or smuggle additional fields and parts into the request the victim service sends downstream. This issue affects req: from 0.5.3 before 0.6.0.
iLBC audio codec crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Multiple protocol dissector crashes in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Dissection engine crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Multiple protocol dissector crashes in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
SCTP protocol dissector heap disclosure in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 might enable denial of service or code execution
PROFINET protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Multiple protocol dissector crashes in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Multiple protocol dissector memory leaks in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
SDP protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 allows denial of service
Protocol dissector crashes in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows attacker-controlled HTTP servers to exhaust memory in a Req client via decompression-bomb response bodies. Req's default response pipeline includes Req.Steps.decode_body/1 and Req.Steps.decompress_body/1 in lib/req/steps.ex. decode_body/1 dispatches on the server-supplied content-type (or URL extension) and calls :zip.extract(body, [:memory]) for application/zip, :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory]) for application/x-tar, and :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed]) for application/gzip / .tgz. Each returns the full decompressed archive contents as a [{name, bytes}] list in memory, with no per-entry or total size cap. decompress_body/1 walks the content-encoding header and chains :zlib/:brotli/:ezstd decoders, so a response advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip inflates through multiple layers without bound. Both steps are enabled by default, no caller opt-in is required, and the attacker controls the content-type and content-encoding headers on their own server (or on any host reached via Req's automatic redirect following). A sub-megabyte response can expand to multiple gigabytes on the victim, crashing the BEAM process. This issue affects req: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.1.