CVE-2026-121481
Integer Overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() with Very Large Input Lengths
Issue summary: Calling EVP_EncodeBlock() with an input length close to INT_MAX
may overflow the calculation of the encoded output size and write past the end
of the caller-supplied output buffer.
Impact summary: No path by which an attacker can trigger this has been
identified. An application that passes an input length near INT_MAX to
EVP_EncodeBlock() could suffer a heap buffer overflow, crashing or corrupting
its own memory, but it must itself supply such a length.
CWE: CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound
Description: EVP_EncodeBlock() base64-encodes a buffer of a caller-supplied
length into an output buffer that the caller allocates. The caller is expected
to reserve 4*((len+2)/3)+1 bytes. For input lengths close to INT_MAX, the
arithmetic that computes the encoded length overflows a signed integer, so the
function writes more data than the documented output size. The result is a
heap buffer overflow in the calling process.
Reaching this requires an application to pass an input length near INT_MAX to
EVP_EncodeBlock(). OpenSSL's TLS, QUIC and CMS implementations never encode
buffers of that size, and the command line tools cannot practically be made to
do so: the limits on reading a proxy password from a file and on bignum sizes
prevent it. An application that accepts an attacker-controlled length and
forwards it to EVP_EncodeBlock() without its own bound check is exposed.
The severity is Low because no attacker-controlled path to the overflow is
known. The caller must already hold a buffer of about two gigabytes before the
defect can be reached.
FIPS impact: no
The affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.