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CVE-2026-99777

net/9p/usbg: remove bogus context initialization in alloc_requests

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/9p/usbg: remove bogus context initialization in alloc_requests alloc_requests() initializes usb9pfs->in_req->context to point at the struct f_usb9pfs instance itself. usb9pfs_queue_tx() later overwrites this with the real struct p9_req_t pointer before every transmit, and usb9pfs_tx_complete() clears it back to NULL after each completion, so in_req->context only ever holds a valid p9_req_t once a request has actually been queued. usb9pfs_clear_tx(), however, can run at any time (mount close, gadget disable) independent of whether a request was ever queued. If it runs before the first usb9pfs_transmit(), it reads the leftover sentinel value, type-confuses the struct f_usb9pfs pointer as a struct p9_req_t, and both writes through it (req->t_err = -ECONNRESET) and hands it to p9_client_cb(), which manipulates req->wq and req->refcount at bogus offsets inside f_usb9pfs. This reliably corrupts memory or panics whenever the transport is torn down before any 9p request has been transmitted, e.g. mounting and immediately unmounting, or a cable disconnect racing the very first request. usb9pfs->out_req->context is set the same way but is never read by this transport (usb9pfs_rx_complete() identifies the instance via ep->driver_data instead), so it serves no purpose either. Both endpoints' ->driver_data are already set to usb9pfs in enable_endpoint(), which is what the completion handlers actually use to recover the f_usb9pfs instance. Just drop the leftover ->context assignments; usb_ep_alloc_request()/alloc_ep_req() already return zeroed requests, so in_req->context correctly starts out NULL.

CVSS n/a EPSS n/a KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-99776

net/9p/usbg: clear stale client pointer on close

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/9p/usbg: clear stale client pointer on close p9_usbg_close() tears down the client transport, but usb9pfs keeps using usb9pfs->client from asynchronous TX and RX completion handlers. A late completion can therefore dereference a client that has already been freed during mount teardown. Clear usb9pfs->client under usb9pfs->lock when closing the transport, detach any pending TX request from in_req->context, and make the TX/RX completion handlers bail out once the transport has been detached. This keeps late completions from touching a freed or rebound p9_client.

CVSS n/a EPSS n/a KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-99775

xfrm: interface: validate the IP header on xmit

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: interface: validate the IP header on xmit Packets injected into an xfrm interface (e.g. AF_PACKET on an xfrmi device) reach the xfrm output path without IP header validation, but xfrm4_transport_output() uses iph->ihl for __skb_pull() and memmove() and expects the header to be valid. vti_tunnel_xmit() already calls pskb_inet_may_pull() before handing packets to the xfrm output path. Do the same in xfrmi_xmit() and perform the header checks ip_rcv_core()/ip6_rcv_core() do on entry to the IP stack: reject wrong IP versions and malformed IPv4 header lengths.

CVSS n/a EPSS n/a KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-99774

xfrm: espintcp: reorder operations within espintcp_init_sk

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: espintcp: reorder operations within espintcp_init_sk When enabled on a socket, espintcp sets the socket callbacks to its own before it has finished setting up its context and published it as icsk_ulp_data. Any one of those callbacks that gets called before will dereference a NULL icsk_ulp_data. Fix this by reording the operations, and add memory barriers to ensure callers will have a struct espintcp_ctx available. Add a few WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCE too while we're there.

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CVE-2026-99773

drm/drm_crtc: ensure dma_fence_ops remain valid during device unbind

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/drm_crtc: ensure dma_fence_ops remain valid during device unbind In [1], sashiko reported the following issue: === snip === Looking at how these fences are managed, drm_crtc_create_fence() creates a dma_fence without taking a reference to the drm_device or drm_crtc. Because the sync_file framework exposes this fence to userspace, the fence can outlive the CRTC. The dma_fence contract requires that data accessed by dma_fence_ops (like get_driver_name) must remain valid for an RCU grace period after the fence is signaled. However, drm_crtc_cleanup() and the subsequent freeing of the device do not wait for an RCU grace period via synchronize_rcu(). If userspace calls ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO) concurrently with a device hot-unplug: CPU1 (Userspace) sync_file_get_name() ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops); if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag()) // Preempted or delayed here CPU2 (Driver Teardown) Signals the fence (setting fence->ops = NULL) Destroys and frees the CRTC without waiting for an RCU grace period CPU1 (Resumes) ops->get_driver_name(fence) -> drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() crtc = fence_to_crtc(fence); // Casts to the freed CRTC return crtc->dev->driver->name; // Use-after-free ... Does the CRTC or DRM device need to be kept alive for the RCU grace period, or should the fence hold a proper reference to prevent the use-after-free when get_driver_name() and get_timeline_name() access the freed CRTC structure? === snap === I believe this to be a correct observation and this patch implements the suggestion of waiting for an RCU grace period before proceeding with destruction of the drm_crtc, so that get_driver_name() and get_timeline_name() can still work.

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CVE-2026-99772

drm/drm_crtc: fix race with dma_fence_signal() in ::get_driver_name()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/drm_crtc: fix race with dma_fence_signal() in ::get_driver_name() Since commit 541c8f2468b9 ("dma-buf: detach fence ops on signal v3"), I'm seeing the BUG_ON() triggering in drm_crtc's fence_to_crtc() via drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() regularly: Call trace: panic+0x58/0x5c die+0x160/0x178 bug_brk_handler+0x70/0xa4 call_el1_break_hook+0x3c/0x1a0 do_el1_brk64+0x24/0x74 el1_brk64+0x34/0x54 el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xfc el1h_64_sync+0x84/0x88 drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name+0x60/0x68 (P) sync_file_get_name+0x184/0x45c sync_file_ioctl+0x404/0xf70 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x1dc This looks to be caused by a code flow similar to the following: +++ snip +++ thread A thread B ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO) sync_file_ioctl() sync_file_get_name() dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked() dma_fence_driver_name() ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops) if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag()) ops->get_driver_name(fence) i.e. drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() test_and_set_bit(SIGNALED) RCU_INIT_POINTER(fence->ops, NULL) drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() BUG_ON(rcu_access_pointer(fence->ops) != &drm_crtc_fence_ops) +++ snap +++ In other words, a fence's ops pointer can now change to NULL on signal, which wasn't the case before the culprit commit and hence the BUG_ON() triggers. Simply drop the BUG_ON() as it's usage of fence ops is invalid now, and because using BUG_ON() and friends to take down the system is an unacceptable way to handle a failure. Note that the adjacent drm_crtc_fence_get_timeline_name() has the same problem and is fixed by this patch as well.

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CVE-2026-99771

wifi: mac80211: reload TDLS header pointer after skb_linearize()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: reload TDLS header pointer after skb_linearize() ieee80211_process_tdls_channel_switch() sets tf = skb->data before it calls skb_linearize(), and reads tf->action_code afterwards. ieee80211_rx_h_data() queues TDLS channel switch requests and responses to the interface after pulling only offsetof(struct ieee80211_tdls_data, u) bytes, so the skb can still be non-linear when the interface work handles it. Drivers that build paged RX skbs do this for every frame that does not fit into the skb head, e.g. iwlwifi (mvm), which is also the only mac80211 driver that sets NL80211_FEATURE_TDLS_CHANNEL_SWITCH. If the remaining data does not fit into the tailroom, skb_linearize() moves the data to a new head and frees the old one, and the action code is then read from freed memory. Depending on what that memory holds by then, the frame is handled as before or ends in the WARN_ON_ONCE() of the default case. The frame only has to be a data frame with the TDLS ethertype from an authorized peer, e.g. relayed by the AP from another station in the BSS; the read happens before the sender is checked to be a TDLS peer. Load tf after skb_linearize(), as the request and response handlers already do. Found by static analysis tool CodeQL.

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CVE-2026-99770

drm/vc4: Publish the output fence outside of job_lock

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: Publish the output fence outside of job_lock job_lock is taken by the V3D interrupt handler, so nesting an IRQ-unsafe lock under it creates an inversion. drm_syncobj_replace_fence() takes drm_syncobj::lock, which other paths acquire with interrupts enabled. For example, a thread interrupted while holding it blocks the handler on job_lock, and the handler can only make progress once the submit path releases job_lock, which it cannot do while waiting for drm_syncobj::lock. This is reported by lockdep: [ 188.139076] ======================================================== [ 188.139086] WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected [ 188.139096] 7.3.0-rc3-00067-gc4f3feeaf60f #67 Tainted: G C [ 188.139108] -------------------------------------------------------- [ 188.139116] swapper/0/0 just changed the state of lock: [ 188.139125] ffff0000054f8ff8 (&vc4->job_lock){-...}-{3:3}, at: vc4_irq+0xa8/0x28c [vc4] [ 188.139234] but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: [ 188.139242] (&syncobj->lock){+.+.}-{3:3} [ 188.139256] and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. [ 188.139267] other info that might help us debug this: [ 188.139275] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 188.139284] CPU0 CPU1 [ 188.139291] ---- ---- [ 188.139299] lock(&syncobj->lock); [ 188.139312] local_irq_disable(); [ 188.139320] lock(&vc4->job_lock); [ 188.139335] lock(&syncobj->lock); [ 188.139350] <Interrupt> [ 188.139358] lock(&vc4->job_lock); [ 188.139372] *** DEADLOCK *** Hand the fence over after job_lock is dropped. The job can complete and drop exec->fence in that window, so take a reference first and publish through the local pointer, as exec may already be gone.

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CVE-2026-99769

drm/vc4: Drop the BO reservations outside of job_lock

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: Drop the BO reservations outside of job_lock vc4_queue_submit() calls drm_exec_fini() with job_lock held and interrupts disabled. Besides unlocking the reservations, drm_exec_fini() frees the object array with kvfree(), which asks for preemptible task context or a non-NMI interrupt, and may reach might_sleep() through vfree(). Considering that an array that exceeds a page can take the vmalloc fallback, call drm_exec_fini() once job_lock is dropped. The reservations are then held across the job kick, which is harmless as nothing in the completion path takes a BO reservation. Note that vc4_attach_fences() has to stay inside the critical section, as it walks exec, which the job done worker is free to release as soon as job_lock is dropped.

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CVE-2026-99768

wifi: mac80211: reinstate IEEE80211_TX_CTL_AMPDU flag in ieee80211_tx_prep_agg()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: reinstate IEEE80211_TX_CTL_AMPDU flag in ieee80211_tx_prep_agg() The commit 592234e941f1 ("wifi: mac80211: Fix iTXQ AMPDU fragmentation handling") changed the way handling of the IEEE80211_TX_CTL_AMPDU flag is done in mac80211, so the only place it is set is in ieee80211_tx_dequeue(). This means that any frames that are sent to the driver via drv_tx() will no longer have the flag set. In particular, this affects packets going through ieee80211_tx_pending(). Evan reported that this can result in the ath9k driver failing to account such packets in its block ack window, eventually overrunning the window and stalling TX. Fix this by reinstating the flag in ieee80211_tx_prep_agg() when inside a valid block ack window. This should be harmless for the TXQ path, and will reinstate the previous behaviour for drivers that use the flag as a signal to track the packet in the window.

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CVE-2026-99767

xfrm4: use a full socket for local errors

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm4: use a full socket for local errors xfrm4_local_error() passes skb->sk to inet_sk() and ip_local_error() without ensuring it points to a full socket. TCP SYN-ACK skbs can be owned by TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request sockets. xfrm4_tunnel_check_size() already checks sk_fullsock() since commit 1620c88887b1 ("xfrm: Fix the usage of skb->sk"), so iptfs_is_too_big() is the only remaining IPv4 caller passing a request socket here: the sk it tests is the listener, while skb->sk is the request socket. When IP-TFS rejects such an skb because it exceeds its payload MTU, the local error path treats the request socket as a struct inet_sock. KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds read in ip_local_error() beyond the request_sock_TCP allocation. Resolve the skb owner with skb_to_full_sk() before accessing inet_sock state or reporting the error. This maps a request socket to its listener and rejects sockets that cannot be used as full sockets, matching what commit 6973a21ee73c ("ipv6: xfrm: use full sockets in local error paths") did for xfrm6_local_error().

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CVE-2026-99766

scsi: aic79xx: Fix NULL pointer dereference in device reset

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: aic79xx: Fix NULL pointer dereference in device reset Since commit c67e63800446 ("scsi: aic79xx: Do not reference SCSI command when resetting device") the device reset SCB has no SCSI command, but ahd_linux_dev_reset() still sets its residual, and ahd_abort_scbs(), which completes it, sets its status. Seen on an AIC-7902 when a failing disk triggered a device reset, which killed the SCSI error handler: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000009c EIP: ahd_linux_dev_reset.cold+0xee/0x26e Add NULL command checks to the accessors in aic79xx_osm.h. Also skip autosense for an SCB without a command and complete it with ahd_done() right away: the REQUEST SENSE path can clear SCB_DEVICE_RESET, after which ahd_done() would dereference the missing command.

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CVE-2026-99765

scsi: target: Fix demo-mode dynamic ACL dev-entry UAF vs LUN teardown

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: Fix demo-mode dynamic ACL dev-entry UAF vs LUN teardown A demo-mode (generate_node_acls=1) login that allocates a dynamic NodeACL populates that ACL's per-LUN dev entries in core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() *before* the ACL is linked onto tpg->acl_node_list by target_add_node_acl(): core_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl(): ... core_tpg_add_node_to_devs(acl, tpg, NULL); /* builds deves */ target_add_node_acl(acl); /* only now listed */ The LUN teardown sweep, core_clear_lun_from_tpg(), enumerates only tpg->acl_node_list, so a dev entry whose ACL is still in the window above is invisible to the sweep and is never disabled. It is left on the se_lun->lun_deve_list after core_tpg_remove_lun() frees the se_lun; when the same unpacked_lun is later re-added and the se_lun is reallocated at the same address, the stale dev entry is rediscovered by target_nacl_find_deve() and core_enable_device_list_for_node() corrupts lun_deve_list: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free ... core_enable_device_list_for_node+0x5ce/0x880 core_tpg_add_node_to_devs+0x169/0x190 core_dev_add_lun+0x146/0x190 target_fabric_port_link+0xe9/0x1b0 configfs_symlink+0x381/0xae0 __x64_sys_symlink+0x55/0x80 The demo-mode login path that drives the ACL/dev-entry creation is reachable by an unauthenticated initiator; the colliding LUN add/remove is a local configfs operation. Commit 49cb77e297dc ("target: Avoid mappedlun symlink creation during lun shutdown") introduced se_lun->lun_shutdown and guarded the *explicit* ACL MappedLUN path (target_fabric_mappedlun_link()), but the demo-mode automatic path, core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() -> core_enable_device_list_for_node(), was never given the equivalent guard, and the publish-after-populate ordering in core_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl() was left unchanged. Fix it in three cooperating parts: 1) Publish the dynamic NodeACL onto acl_node_list *before* creating its dev entries, so the teardown sweep can observe them. 2) Refuse to attach a dev entry to an se_lun that is shutting down, checked under nacl->lun_entry_mutex -- the same lock the sweep takes -- so once the sweep has passed an ACL any later enable for that LUN observes lun_shutdown and skips it. 3) In core_enable_device_list_for_node(), insert the new dev entry onto lun->lun_deve_list while still holding nacl->lun_entry_mutex, in both the replace and the new-entry branch. Previously the entry was added to nacl->lun_entry_hlist under the mutex but to lun->lun_deve_list only after dropping it; with the ACL now published early, the sweep could take the mutex in that gap, find the entry on the hlist, core_disable_device_list_for_node() it (list_del() on the not-yet- linked lun_link succeeds and the entry is freed), and then the enable would list_add_tail() the freed entry back onto lun_deve_list. Linking both lists under the mutex makes enable and the sweep mutually exclusive, closing that window. core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() already ignores the return value of core_enable_device_list_for_node(), so a shutting-down LUN is simply skipped.

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CVE-2026-99764

9p/xen: validate the response size from the backend

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 9p/xen: validate the response size from the backend p9_xen_response() takes the length of an incoming response from the ring -- the first field of the 9p header, which the Xen transport reuses as its framing header -- and uses it to advance the consumer index, but never checks that it is at least the header size or no larger than the number of bytes the backend has actually produced. A malicious or buggy backend can post a response whose size is smaller than the header (for example 0). The consumer index then never advances, so the response work re-reads the same ring contents instead of making progress. In testing this raced with the teardown that the malformed reply triggers and dereferenced a freed p9_client: 9pfs 9pfs-0: Wrong req tag=ffff BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000060 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5 #6 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events p9_xen_response RIP: 0010:idr_find+0x4/0x10 RSP: 0018:ffffbf5d80063de8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffa229c21195a0 RCX: ffffa229c2400000 RDX: ffffa229c11c2200 RSI: 000000000000ffff RDI: 0000000000000050 RBP: 000000000000ffff R08: 3fffffffffffdfff R09: ffffffffffffffff R10: 3fffffffffffdfff R11: ffffffff87a60e80 R12: 0000000000000050 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000100000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa22a7661c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000060 CR3: 000000003ac34002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> p9_tag_lookup+0x2b/0x90 p9_xen_response+0x17c/0x2e0 process_one_work+0x16a/0x3a0 worker_thread+0x172/0x2e0 kthread+0xdd/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x18b/0x240 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000060 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Reject a response whose size is outside [sizeof(header), queued] before using it, matching the validation the backend already applies to incoming requests.

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CVE-2026-99763

9p: don't decrement a server-owned zero nlink

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 9p: don't decrement a server-owned zero nlink A 9P2000.L server can report nlink=0 for a regular file that still exists. On a cache=loose or cache=fscache mount, lookup stores that value with set_nlink(). A later successful unlink calls v9fs_dec_count(), which still calls drop_nlink() for a non-directory. drop_nlink() warns, and the unsigned link count wraps to 4294967295. fstat() on a descriptor opened before the unlink shows 0 before and 4294967295 after. The warning on the unpatched kernel, trimmed: WARNING: fs/inode.c:408 at drop_nlink+0xac/0xd0, CPU#1: trigger/188 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 188 Comm: trigger Tainted: G N 7.3.0-rc4-00537-ga3ff15db6820 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:drop_nlink+0xac/0xd0 Call Trace: <TASK> v9fs_remove+0x529/0x750 vfs_unlink+0x2f0/0xbd0 filename_unlinkat+0x340/0x6c0 __x64_sys_unlink+0x46/0x70 do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x4f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Directories whose cached nlink is at most 2 already skip this decrement, because the exported filesystem may not maintain nlink (commit ac89b2ef9b559). cache=none skips it as well (commit 574aa0b479947). cache=mmap does not take this path: it sets neither CACHE_META nor CACHE_LOOSE. A regular file on cache=loose or cache=fscache still does. Its count came from GETATTR and may already be zero, so skip the decrement when i_nlink is already 0. Verified on 7.3-rc4-00537-ga3ff15db6820 with only this change. A server that advertises nlink=0 and accepts the unlink no longer warns, and the open descriptor stays at nlink 0. An honest server on the same mount still goes from 1 to 0. A rejected unlink leaves the count unchanged. cache=none is unchanged. With panic_on_warn the unpatched kernel panics on the warning; the patched kernel does not.

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CVE-2026-99762

batman-adv: mcast: validate tracker padding before forwarding

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: mcast: validate tracker padding before forwarding A multicast tracker with an even number of destinations needs two padding bytes after its destination list. batadv_mcast_forw_packet() currently only checks that the count field and the addresses fit in the tracker TVLV. If an unpadded even tracker is compacted to an odd number of destinations, batadv_mcast_forw_shrink_update_headers() includes those missing padding bytes in the amount to remove. The subsequent memmove can then write two bytes past the old packet tail. With no tailroom, this corrupts skb_shared_info. Include the required padding in the existing tracker length check. This rejects the malformed tracker before either received or locally generated packets can reach the compactor.

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CVE-2026-99761

batman-adv: stop originator purge worker before freeing TT

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: stop originator purge worker before freeing TT batadv_mesh_free() releases the translation tables via batadv_tt_free() before batadv_originator_free() stops orig_work. The purge worker can therefore still run while the TT is torn down. When an originator times out, batadv_purge_orig_ref() calls batadv_tt_global_del_orig(), which loads tt.global_hash and walks all buckets while taking their locks: CPU0 CPU1 batadv_tt_free() batadv_purge_orig() batadv_tt_global_del_orig() hash = ...tt.global_hash; batadv_tt_global_table_free() batadv_hash_destroy(hash); spin_lock_bh(&hash->list_locks[i]); Disable orig_work at the beginning of batadv_mesh_free(), directly after the mesh was marked as deactivating. The second disable_delayed_work_sync() in batadv_originator_free() is harmless because it is free'd anyway.

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CVE-2026-99760

batman-adv: tt: ignore ROAM flag of received ADD changes

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: tt: ignore ROAM flag of received ADD changes A received TT change (OGM diff or full table response) with the ROAM flag but without DEL is handled by batadv_tt_global_add() like a ROAMING_ADV: * a newly created global entry gets BATADV_TT_CLIENT_ROAM and is therefore excluded from the global CRC. The sender has it in its local CRC and the receiver has to request the full table again * batadv_tt_global_purge_local() removes the local entry of the receiver. The receiver's own client is considered as roamed to the sender and frames for it are rerouted The ROAM flag only has a meaning together with DEL. Drop it on reception to keep it from populating the global table with a temporary ROAMING entry which is not part of the CRC - and therefore causing a CRC mismatch.

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CVE-2026-99759

batman-adv: tt: don't drop local events queued during TVLV update

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: tt: don't drop local events queued during TVLV update batadv_tt_tvlv_container_update() read the number of local changes without holding changes_list_lock. batadv_tt_local_event() is not serialized by the commit_lock and can queue new events before the changes_list is flushed: CPU0 CPU1 batadv_tt_tvlv_container_update() num = ...local_changes; batadv_tt_local_event() list_add_tail(...); ...local_changes++; spin_lock_bh(&...changes_list_lock); /* only num events copied but all freed */ The additional events were freed without ever being sent. Other nodes will only notice this via a CRC mismatch and must request the full table. The number of changes and the changes_list must therefore be taken atomically. Events queued afterwards then stay in the tt.changes_list for the next TT round. The changes can no longer be kept for the next round when the TVLV buffer allocation fails. But they would be sent with a skipped TTVN anyway, so the other nodes have to request the full table in this case either way. The last changeset is only dropped in this case when the TTVN was incremented. Without new changes, it still describes the current TTVN. Previously, the unconsumed changes caused a retry of the TVLV container update in the next commit round. Since the changes are now consumed, the next round would only take the path without changes and wait for BATADV_TT_OGM_APPEND_MAX rounds before updating the container again. Until then, the outdated container with the previous TTVN would still be announced. The ogm_append_cnt is therefore reset on failure to retry the update in the next OGM interval. This doesn't make the CRC consistent with the announced changeset. The local table modifications are still not serialized with the commit and batadv_tt_local_transition_new() can still make a client part of the CRC for which the event is only part of the next TT round. Such an inconsistency is detected by the CRC check of the other nodes and solved via a full table request.

CVSS n/a EPSS n/a KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-99758

sctp: account for chunk padding in sctp_init_cause()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: account for chunk padding in sctp_init_cause() sctp_init_cause() accepts a chunk when skb_tailroom() can hold the cause header and the payload. sctp_addto_chunk() then writes 0-3 bytes of padding before that header so the chunk stays 4-byte aligned. The check does not include the padding, and the following skb_put() calls skb_over_panic() from softirq. Count the padding sctp_addto_chunk() is about to write. The cause length on the wire stays the header plus the payload. Found by LLM inspection, triggered and tested the fix.

CVSS n/a EPSS n/a KEV · Not listed
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