FoE Filename Matching Bypass via Length Truncation
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RT-Labs AB | SOES | unaffected |
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Vendor Solution
Update SOES to v3.2.1 or later
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
No EPSS score available.
Key SSVC decision points have not yet been added.
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | FOE_read and FOE_write store the filename length as uint8_t, truncating it modulo 256. When (mbxheader.length - ESC_FOEHSIZE) is a multiple of 256, the length becomes 0. Additionally, a request whose mailbox length equals ESC_FOEHSIZE exactly also produces a length of 0 without any truncation. In both cases FOE_fopen calls strncmp with a length of 0, which always returns equal, so the first registered file whose password is 0 is opened regardless of the filename the master sent. | |
| Title | FoE Filename Matching Bypass via Length Truncation | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-131 CWE-284 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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