Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Use after free in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Use after free in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Use after free in Network Policy Server (NPS) allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
Use after free in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Use after free in Remote Desktop Client allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Microsoft Account allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Use after free in Microsoft Office PowerPoint allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Storage allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Use after free in Windows Embedded Mode Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Use after free in Windows iSCSI allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
Use after free in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Use after free in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Use after free in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Use after free in Windows Enterprise App Management allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Use after free in Windows Remote Desktop Services allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: queue a mount only once for mount notifications mnt_notify_add() puts a mount on notify_list. It doesn't check whether the mount is on the list already. That's fine as long as every mount is queued at most once per namespace_sem hold. It isn't. propagate_umount() moves a surviving overmount off a stack of mounts that are going away and queues it as moved. shrink_submounts() and mark_mounts_for_expiry() call umount_tree() for several mounts under a single namespace_sem hold. So the second umount_tree() can take down exactly the mount the first one reparented, reparent it once more and so end up queueing it a second time. The second list_add_tail() cuts the mounts queued in between out of the list while the head still points at the last of them. notify_mnt_list() then only visits that one mount and the others are freed after the grace period with notify_list still pointing at them. Every later mount operation on the host walks freed memory: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __list_add_valid_or_report Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881003d57e0 by task notify_dq/162 __list_add_valid_or_report+0x15c/0x1a0 mnt_add_to_ns+0x322/0x890 attach_recursive_mnt.isra.0+0xf2a/0x1a00 path_mount+0x139c/0x1d40 This needs a mount with MNT_SHRINKABLE to bind from. That's what finish_automount() creates (submounts of NFS, AFS and CIFS and the tracefs mount below debugfs). Bind mounts inherit the flag. A mount namespace with a FAN_MARK_MNTNS mark does the rest and root in a user namespace can have both. Initialize to_notify in alloc_vfsmnt() and leave a mount alone that is queued already. mnt_notify() looks at the state the mount has when the list is drained so a single entry per mount is enough. The move event for a mount that is unmounted under the same hold is lost. That's fine. The detach is what matters.
Use after free in Remote Desktop Client allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
Use after free in Remote Desktop Client allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: fs/xattr: don't assume the inode is locked in path_unlink/path_rmdir bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked() makes the verifier rewrite bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr() to the _locked variants, which assume that the caller already holds the inode's i_rwsem. The path_unlink and path_rmdir hooks are listed, but security_path_unlink() and security_path_rmdir() run before vfs_unlink()/vfs_rmdir() take the victim inode's i_rwsem, so a sleepable BPF LSM program attached to either hook mutates the victim's xattrs without the lock held. Drop the two path hooks from d_inode_locked_hooks so that the verifier keeps the locking bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr() variants, which take the lock themselves.
Use after free in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Use after free in Microsoft Windows Search Component allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.