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CVE-2026-93477

Private action arguments can be set by user input on the bulk destroy and bulk update paths in Ash

Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash allows a user to set the value of a private action argument on the bulk destroy and bulk update paths. Action arguments declared with public?: false are meant to be set only by trusted server-side code (for example via Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3) and must not be settable from end-user input. CVE-2026-55736 fixed the non-bulk changeset path to strip private arguments from user-supplied parameter maps, but the bulk destroy and bulk update paths were not covered. Ash.Actions.Destroy.Bulk.base_changeset/5 and Ash.Actions.Update.Bulk.base_changeset/5 match every key in the caller-supplied parameter map against all of the action's arguments with no public? check, then apply the matches to the base changeset. A caller who can submit parameters to a bulk destroy or bulk update action (for example through AshJsonApi, AshGraphql, or a controller that forwards request parameters to Ash.bulk_destroy/4 or Ash.bulk_update/4) can therefore set any private argument of that action, including one referenced by an arg(...) template in the action's changes or validations. Depending on how the application uses the argument (for example an acting_user_id driving authorization or record ownership, or audit metadata), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation. The fix requires public? in the argument matching on both bulk paths; private arguments remain settable server-side via the :private_arguments option. This issue affects ash: from 2.17.15 before 3.33.11.

CVSS 4.0 · 5.9 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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Ash
CVE-2025-48043

Bypass and runtime policies that can never pass may be incorrectly applied in filter authorization

Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash allows Authentication Bypass. This issue affects ash: from 0.1.1 before 3.6.2.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.6 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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Ash
CVE-2025-48044

Authorization bypass when bypass policy condition evaluates to true

Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash allows Authentication Bypass. This issue affects ash: from 3.6.3 before 3.7.1.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.6 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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Ash
CVE-2025-48042

Before action hooks may execute in certain scenarios despite a request being forbidden

Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects ash: from 0.1.1 before 3.5.39.

CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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Ash
CVE-2026-86338

Ash field policies do not filter-nil forbidden calculations and aggregates, enabling an information-disclosure oracle

Ash field_policies are documented to protect against filter-based information disclosure: when a field the actor may not see is referenced in a filter, it is replaced with an expression that evaluates to nil, so a filter cannot be used as a yes/no oracle to read a value the actor cannot see. This nilling was applied to attributes but not to calculations or aggregates. A user-supplied filter reference to a calculation or aggregate carries an Ash.Query.Calculation / Ash.Query.Aggregate struct, which the authorizer's reference replacement did not match (it only matched the Ash.Resource.* structs), so the filter ran against the real value. As a result, an actor whose field policies forbid a calculation or aggregate can still filter by it (for example filter(secret_calc == "x") or filter(comment_count == n)) and learn the value from whether rows match — an oracle that recovers field-policy-protected values one probe at a time. Filtering is commonly exposed to lower-privileged actors (for example via AshGraphql or AshJsonApi filter arguments), which is exactly the surface field policies are meant to protect. The fix routes filter references to calculations and aggregates through the same field-policy nilling as attributes. This issue affects ash: from 2.11.0-rc.0 before 3.33.4.

CVSS 4.0 · 6 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-78216

AshLua eval read operations can read field-policy-protected fields via aggregates

AshLua exposes Ash read actions to Lua scripts run through an eval action. A read call accepts an operation (list, min, max, first, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value. Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A script could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate instead of as a field. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The prior hardening only enforced the exposed-field allow-list (field visibility), which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization. The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible. This issue affects ash_lua: from 0.1.0 before 0.2.2.

CVSS 4.0 · 6 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-78230

AshAi aggregate tool can read field-policy-protected fields

AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value. Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization. The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3.

CVSS 4.0 · 6 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-55736

Private action arguments can be set by user input in Ash

Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash allows a user to set the value of a private action argument that is intended to be controlled only by trusted server-side code. Action arguments declared with public?: false are meant to be set internally (for example via Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3) and must not be settable from end-user input. When a changeset is built from a parameter map, Ash filters out private arguments, but the filtering is incomplete. In the regular changeset path (for_create, for_update, for_destroy), private arguments are stripped only when the parameter key is an atom. When the key is a binary (string), as is the case for user-supplied parameters, the private argument is kept and the user controls its value. In the atomic path (Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset/4, also reached through atomic and bulk updates), private arguments are not stripped at all, regardless of whether the key is an atom or a binary. An attacker who can submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can therefore inject a value for that argument. Depending on how the application uses the argument (for example an acting_user_id driving authorization or record ownership), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation. This issue affects ash: from 3.0.0 before 3.29.3.

CVSS 4.0 · 5.9 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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Ash
CVE-2026-34593

Ash Framework: Ash.Type.Module.cast_input/2 atom exhaustion via unchecked Module.concat allows BEAM VM crash

Ash Framework is a declarative, extensible framework for building Elixir applications. Prior to version 3.22.0, Ash.Type.Module.cast_input/2 unconditionally creates a new Erlang atom via Module.concat([value]) for any user-supplied binary string that starts with "Elixir.", before verifying whether the referenced module exists. Because Erlang atoms are never garbage-collected and the BEAM atom table has a hard default limit of approximately 1,048,576 entries, an attacker who can submit values to any resource attribute or argument of type :module can exhaust this table and crash the entire BEAM VM, taking down the application. This issue has been patched in version 3.22.0.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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