In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 remote code execution was possible via class injection in the Kotlin DSL sandbox
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Stored XSS vulnerability in P4 Code Review build tab
In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 stored XSS on the P4 Code Review build tab was possible
Stored Cross‑Site Scripting via Issue Log Tab
In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 stored XSS on the Issue Log tab was possible
In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 an LDAP injection allowed bypassing login restrictions
TeamCity Kotlin DSL permits arbitrary file deletion
In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 arbitrary file deletion on the server was possible via the Kotlin DSL sandbox
Kotlin DSL Sandbox File Write Bypass Enables Remote Code Execution in JetBrains TeamCity
In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 remote code execution was possible via a file write bypass in the Kotlin DSL sandbox
Stored Cross‑Site Scripting in JetBrains TeamCity Build and Queue Pages
In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 stored XSS on build and queue pages was possible
Stored Cross‑Site Scripting Vulnerability in TeamCity SSH Key Management
In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 stored XSS in SSH key management was possible
In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2 poisoning of OAuth discovery metadata via the X-Forwarded-Host header was possible
Stored XSS in JetBrains TeamCity NPM Connection Health Report
In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 stored XSS in the npm connection health report was possible
Stored XSS via checkout rules path preview in JetBrains TeamCity
In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 stored XSS in the checkout rules path preview was possible
Stored XSS via Unknown VCS Root in JetBrains TeamCity
In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 stored XSS on the unknown VCS root page was possible
Remote Code Execution via Kotlin DSL Compiler Arguments in JetBrains TeamCity
In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.1, 2026.1.5 remote code execution was possible via Kotlin DSL compiler arguments
Dell PowerStore SDNAS buffer overflow enabling unauthenticated remote denial of service or code execution
Dell PowerStore SDNAS contains a buffer overflow vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service or potential code execution on the NAS node.
Path Traversal Allowing Arbitrary File Access on Dell PowerStore SDNAS
Dell PowerStore SDNAS contains a path traversal vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to read, modify, or delete arbitrary files on the NAS node.
Local Configuration Injection via Extended Command Line in OpenVPN
Argument injection in OpenVPN version 2.4.0 through 2.6.23 and 2.7_alpha1 through 2.7.8 on Windows allows local authenticated users to bypass interactive service option validation and add arbitrary configuration options via a crafted command line.
mm/filemap: read mapping->a_ops->free_folio under i_lock
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/filemap: read mapping->a_ops->free_folio under i_lock memory_failure() -> ... -> filemap_remove_folio() can read mapping->a_ops after the inode has been freed. Once the folio is deleted from the pagecache it no longer pins the mapping, so after i_lock is dropped e.g., a concurrent final iput() can evict and free the inode before filemap_free_folio() looks up mapping->a_ops->free_folio. Most callers hold a reference on the inode, but not all. Documentation/filesystems/vfs.rst explicitly states that ->free_folio() must not assume the original address_space mapping still exists. Fix it by loading ->free_folio while i_lock is still held, similar to what folio_unmap_invalidate() does. Inline filemap_free_folio() into its remaining caller such that delete_from_page_cache_batch() also just loads the callback before dropping the i_lock. The bug was found by code inspection and has not been reproduced. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private. [ david: get rid of filemap_free_folio() entirely; improve patch description ]
mm/truncate: look again if a folio left the mapping
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/truncate: look again if a folio left the mapping invalidate_inode_pages2_range() skips a folio which no longer belongs to the mapping by the time it has got the folio lock, on the assumption that somebody else has removed it from the page cache. But the folio may have been replaced, and then there is a new folio with the same data at that index. For most cases, like folio migration, that is impossible. However, collapse_file() only checks the refcount of the old folios, under the i_pages lock, and relies on their folio locks from there on. That works for users which repeat the lookup when they find folio->mapping changed. The following scenario is, however, possible: CPU0 pwrite(O_DIRECT) CPU1 collapse_file() kiocb_invalidate_pages() read the folio (old data), lock it refcount check the write completes copy to new_folio kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write() find_get_entries() -> old folio xas_store(new_folio) folio->mapping = NULL folio_unlock(folio) folio_lock() folio->mapping != mapping -> continue In that scenario, the collapsed folio with the data from before the write stays in the page cache after the write has returned. This used to be impossible, as khugepaged only collapsed files that nobody had open for writing. Restart the lookup at that index, like shmem_undo_range() does. The same problem seems to exist in truncate_inode_pages_range() as well when truncate_inode_folio() fails, so handle it there as well, but slightly differently: simply check once more through find_get_entries().
mm/shmem: make shmem_file() check the file's inode
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: make shmem_file() check the file's inode shmem_file() only checks if file->f_mapping is a shmem mapping. This mapping can belong to another file, however, as with a Coda file backed by a tmpfs container after mmap(). So it does not guarantee that the file inode is an actual shmem inode. Seal handling and memfd preservation use this check before accessing shmem inode state, so they can access an inode of the wrong type. Let's make shmem_file() check the inode's file operations instead, to identify shmem inodes reliably. This will identify regular shmem inodes, including memfds and ordinary tmpfs files, independently of wrapper file operations. Use shmem_mapping() in collapse_file() instead to not change the behavior of collapse_file(): it operates on the page cache and uses mapping->host for shmem inode operations. Focusing on the file does not seem relevant.
mm/shmem: fix truncate hang in large swap entry
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: fix truncate hang in large swap entry Truncating a tmpfs file or memfd to a page-aligned size inside a large swap entry can loop indefinitely in shmem_undo_range(). The task holds the inode lock and cannot be killed. A large swap entry represents a whole swapped-out folio. For example, truncate a file whose pages 0-7 share one swap entry to four pages: [ 0 1 2 3 | 4 5 6 7 ] keep | discard ^ new EOF, start = 4 i_size has already been updated when boundary handling asks shmem_get_partial_folio() for page 4. Since it is swapped out, the helper calls shmem_get_folio() with SGP_READ. That rejects page 4 with -EINVAL because its starting offset equals i_size. Nothing is read back. The final scan cannot free the entry without losing pages 0-3. It skips it, restarts from start = 4, and finds it again indefinitely. An unaligned truncate avoids this particular failure because the requested page starts below i_size. Folios already in the page-cache cannot trigger it as the direct lookup will return them beyond EOF. Fix it by letting shmem_get_partial_folio() call shmem_swapin_folio() directly for swap entries. This bypasses the read path's i_size check, allowing the existing boundary handling to zero and split the folio. If swap-in returns a smaller folio, it also splits the swap entry so the final scan can free the entries beyond EOF. Retry the lookup if the entry changes during swap-in. Handling swap-in allocation failures remains broken and is unchanged by this commit. Even when shmem_swapin_folio() correctly returns -ENOMEM instead of -EEXIST, shmem_get_partial_folio() returns NULL and shmem_undo_range() skips boundary handling. If the large swap entry remains intact, truncation can still loop in the final scan, while hole punching can return without zeroing the boundary. This may read an entire large folio back from swap while holding i_rwsem, only to discard part of it. Avoiding that I/O would require splitting both the swap entry and any large folio still in the swap cache. That, however, is much bigger work.