HID Parser Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in HID Parser Library allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in HID Parser Library allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Color Management allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
P-Net before 1.0.4 does not check the record data length of an IODWrite request to a non-user record index against the size of the record block header. The 32-bit length is reduced by the header size before it is passed to the record handlers, so a length smaller than the header underflows and the handlers receive a data length of about 65530. The fixed-size reads of the I&M and PDPort handlers can then read past the end of the session buffer. The result of the write is discarded. The attacker must have an established Application Relationship or be able to send in the context of one, and requires ADJACENT network access.
Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows Bluetooth Port Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows Kernel allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges with a physical attack.
Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows Internet Information Services allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.
FFmpeg through 9.0.2 contains an integer underflow in decode_frame() in libavcodec/lcldec.c that allows attackers to trigger a heap out-of-bounds read via short ZLIB packets with FLAG_MULTITHREAD. Attackers can supply a crafted AVI or MKV file with an LCL video stream whose packet is shorter than 8 bytes, bypassing length clamping to crash the decoding application.
The RFCOMM multiplexer control-channel handler in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/rfcomm.c computed the echo length for a BT_RFCOMM_TEST command as buf->len - 1 and passed it to rfcomm_send_test(), whose length parameter is a uint8_t. A malformed but FCS-valid UIH frame on DLCI 0 can leave buf->len == 0 after rfcomm_handle_msg() pulls the two-byte MCC header, so buf->len - 1 underflows and narrows to 255. rfcomm_send_test() then copies 255 bytes out of a receive buffer that holds no remaining valid data, and appends them to an outgoing L2CAP PDU allocated with only CONFIG_BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU (253 by default for CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC) bytes of tailroom. The source read runs past the end of the ACL receive buffer into adjacent buffers of the same net_buf pool, and the destination copy overruns the transmit buffer by about eight bytes; net_buf_add_mem() performs no runtime bounds check in ordinary builds, where the underlying __ASSERT_NO_MSG() is compiled out. The trigger is a single five-byte RFCOMM frame on the multiplexer control channel, which is processed as soon as the L2CAP channel for PSM 3 is established — before any DLC exists and independent of RFCOMM session state. bt_rfcomm_init() registers that L2CAP server with .sec_level = BT_SECURITY_L1, which l2cap_br_conn_security() accepts without any link key from a peer that does not claim host Secure Simple Pairing support, so an unpaired BR/EDR device in radio range of a connectable target with CONFIG_BT_RFCOMM enabled (SPP, HFP, HSP, GOEP and similar profiles all enable it) can reach the defect. The resulting 255-byte TEST response is transmitted back to the attacker, disclosing roughly 255 bytes of adjacent stack/pool memory — including the contents of neighbouring receive buffers, which an attacker can prime with earlier packets — and the accompanying out-of-bounds write corrupts memory following the transmit buffer, which can crash the Bluetooth host. The request is trivially repeatable, so both the disclosure and the corruption can be driven at will. Two fixes are needed, and the first on its own does not close the out-of-bounds write. Fix 1 (0040ef781e1d, #115768) strips the FCS byte in rfcomm_recv() and echoes buf->len, rejecting anything over UINT8_MAX, which removes the underflow and the over-read. But rfcomm_make_uih_msg() still allocates the response with bt_l2cap_create_pdu() and never compares the requested length with the buffer's tailroom, so a well-formed TEST command carrying a pattern of about 248 bytes or more still builds a response (3-byte frame header, 2-byte message header, pattern, FCS) larger than the 253 bytes available. A pattern that long can only be received when the RFCOMM L2CAP receive MTU (CONFIG_BT_RFCOMM_L2CAP_MTU, which defaults to CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE) exceeds CONFIG_BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU. The plain BR/EDR defaults (200 against 253) cannot reach it, but from v4.3.0 enabling CONFIG_BT_GOEP raises CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE to 264 (265 from v4.4.0), so GOEP builds with only fix 1 applied still overrun the transmit buffer by up to eight bytes. This includes v4.3.2, the last v4.3 release, which carries fix 1 but will not receive fix 2. Fix 2 (214530895dd3, #118293) checks the tailroom on every RFCOMM PDU allocation and closes this residual write.
Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
A flaw was found in BusyBox's udhcpc DHCP client. When processing raw DHCP packets, the client replaces the validated packet length with an attacker-controlled value from the IP header without re-validating the minimum size. This leads to an integer underflow when subtracting header sizes, causing a subsequent memory copy with a massively oversized length. An attacker on the same network segment can send a specially crafted packet to crash the DHCP client, resulting in denial of service and loss of network connectivity.
Hickory DNS from 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 contains an integer underflow vulnerability in TSIG RDATA decoding that allows remote attackers to trigger a panic via malformed records. Attackers can send a crafted TSIG record in DNS wire format to cause unchecked subtraction underflow, crashing builds with overflow checks enabled and causing denial of service.
Insufficient parameter sanitization in AMD Secure Processor (ASP) TEE DrvSys could allow an attacker with local access to the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) interface or Trusted Application (TA) to cause an out-of-bounds write, potentially resulting in a loss of platform integrity or denial of service.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix eswitch mode block underflow on IPsec acquire SA mlx5e_xfrm_add_state() handles acquire-flow temporary SAs by allocating software state and skipping hardware offload setup. That path jumps to the common success label before taking the eswitch mode block. After tunnel-mode validation was moved earlier, the common success label unconditionally calls mlx5_eswitch_unblock_mode(). For acquire SAs, this decrements esw->offloads.num_block_mode without a matching increment. Return directly after installing the acquire SA offload handle, so only the paths that successfully called mlx5_eswitch_block_mode() call the matching unblock.
Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows Update Stack allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally.
In afe, there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege if a malicious actor has already obtained the System privilege. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS11431385; Issue ID: MSV-9920.
Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows Storage Spaces Controller allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows exFAT File System allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound) vulnerability in erlang otp erlang/otp (erts modules), erlang otp erts (erts modules) allows Forced Integer Overflow, Excessive Allocation. This vulnerability is associated with program files erts/emulator/beam/external.c, emulator/beam/external.c. The BIT_BINARY_EXT tag (77) handler in the External Term Format (ETF) decoder accepts an encoding with both length and trailing-bits fields set to zero. The subsequent computation of the bitstring size underflows an unsigned integer, producing a value of roughly 2^64 that is then passed as a memory allocation size. The allocator aborts the entire node with a message such as Cannot allocate 2305843009213693951 bytes of memory (of type "binary"). The crash is a VM-level abort, not an Erlang-level exception. It cannot be intercepted by supervision trees, by try/catch, or by passing the [safe] option to binary_to_term/2 (which only restricts atom creation and does not perform structural validation of binary encodings). Any application that decodes ETF from untrusted sources via binary_to_term/1,2 or enif_binary_to_term() is exposed. The Erlang distribution protocol also decodes incoming terms through the same code path, but distribution is expected to run on trusted networks per the OTP Secure Coding Guidelines (DSG-011). This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 before OTP 27.3.4.15, OTP 28.5.0.4, and OTP 29.0.4, corresponding to erts from 15.0 before 15.2.7.11, 16.4.0.4, and 17.0.4.
Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Microsoft QUIC allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.